The relationship between income and voting is usually studied using current income. Instead, I estimate how permanent income affects voting and to what extent voters are forward looking. A proxy for permanent income is constructed from stated expectations about one's future economic situation. Using panel data from the Norwegian Election Study I estimate the effect of stated expectations on realized future income to compute the effect of expectations. This is then linked to voting behaviour. Contrasting permanent and transitory income, the former has a large impact and the latter has little explanatory power on voting. This supports the hypothesis of forward looking voting. A high expected permanent income increase the propensity to vote Conservative.
Introduction
The poor are generally thought to be more in favour of redistribution than the rich as they take a smaller share of the burden of financing the welfare state and often receive a larger share of the benefits. This conjecture finds empirical support: Endorsement of tax cuts and cuts in redistributive programs is more widespread among the rich than the poor. Empirical studies also confirm that this translates into voting behaviour; there is a tendency for rich voters to vote for conservative parties.
Virtually all such studies take for granted that preferences are shaped by transitory income. Modern economic theory, though, building on the work of Friedman (1957) and countless others, postulate that agents are rational and forward looking. If this is true, then voting does not only depend on income today, but also the path one expects it to take in the future, summarized for instance by expected permanent income. As we believe that people at least to some extent look ahead when forming opinions and making choices, it may be more relevant to look at permanent than transitory income. I argue that this is the case if there are costs of changing policies from one period to the next, so there is a status quo bias.
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, I study to what extent voting behaviour is formed by permanent income and to what extent it is formed by transitory income. Second, the effect of income on party preferences are not necessarily the same when we study permanent income and transitory income. The method suggested here provides a tool to estimate the relationship between income and voting using the correct measure of income.
To study this, I use data from the Norwegian Election Study from 1977 to 1997. This data set is a panel, which is still uncommon for electoral surveys. The panel structure is crucial for the identification of separate effects of transitory and permanent income. To construct a proxy for permanent income, I use the answer to questions regarding respondent's expectations about their economic future. From the panel structure of the data, I can estimate how stated expectations in the first period affect realized income in the second period. From these estimates, I construct a measure of expected discounted future income, from which we can derive the expected permanent income. This procedure permits separation of the effects of permanent and transitory income.
It turns out that voting behaviour is almost entirely determined by permanent income, leaving little role for transitory income. Furthermore, permanent income has the expected effect of making Conservative voting more likely and Socialist voting less likely. Both of these effects are strongly significant. Hence it seems that voters are forward looking when casting their votes, and the voting behaviour seems to correspond reasonably well to the one derived from standard political economy models.
The paper complements several strands of literature. First, there is a literature studying the relationship between income and preferences for redistribution (Husted 1989) , taxes (Lewis 1979) , and public goods provision (Bergstrom et al. 1982, Gramlich and . The general finding in this literature, which is surprisingly scarce, is a negative, although often quite weak, relationship between income and preferences in favour of redistribution. This literature is surveyed more extensively in Lind (2006) . That paper studies the relationship between transitory income and voting, using a fixed effects panel data estimator to control for unobserved individual characteristics. The principal finding is that high income tends to lower the support for redistribution and induce Conservative voting, but the effect is strongly reduced by correcting for individual specific unobserved effects. This work, as well as other contributions in this tradition only look at transitory income, which may understate the effect of income on party choice if permanent income is what really matters.
There is also an empirical literature studying how prospects of upward economic mobility reduces support for redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 , Corneo and Grüner 2002 , Ravallion and Lokshin 2000 , as well as some studies relating expected future economic situation to preferences (e.g. Husted 1989 ). These findings are related to Bénabou and Ok's (2001) theoretical model where they explain how social mobility may explain the lack of support for redistribution with a median voter that is poorer than the mean. This literature, however, is less suitable to study the general relationship between income and redistribution, and then also how the income distribution affects policy. Indirectly, the paper also relates to the empirical literature of permanent income and consumption surveyed by e.g. Deaton (1992) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) , but the object of scrutiny is different.
There are also several papers that construct dynamic political economy models. Krusell, Quadrini, and R´ı o s -R u l l (1997) and Krusell and R´ı o s -R u l l (1999) extend the basic model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to a dynamic and stochastic economy where agents are rational and forward looking. As politics today will affect investments, and hence the economy tomorrow, the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium becomes more complicated than the standard static case. This reasoning is taken further by Hassler et al. (2003 Hassler et al. ( , 2005 who construct overlapping generations models to study both the dynamic effects of different policies and the conflict between generations. This literature is overwhelmingly theoretical. One objective of this paper is to make an attempt of taking this literature to the data.
Theoretical background
Before embarking on the empirical specification, it is useful to dwell briefly on how and why we should expect different income paths to affect political preferences. Although this could be done in a formal model, 1 such models quickly get quite complicated and most of the arguments may be stated transparently without formalization.
Consider first the case where there is no persistence in politics. Then the next election can be seen as completely separate from today's election, so what happens after the next election is irrelevant for voting today. Hence voting will be shaped by the expected income path over the next electoral period. A rational voter will favour the tax rate that maximizes her expected discounted utility over this period, which gives a preferred tax rate which for most practical purposes depends on the expected discounted income over the electoral period.
2 As income today is a reasonably good indicator for income throughout an electoral period, introducing foresight with regard to the income path would not change the picture in any fundamental way in this case.
A more interesting case arises if there is persistence in policy making. There are several arguments for why politics are persistent. First, it is unreasonable that a new government can overthrow all decisions made by the preceding government on its first day in office without any costs. The tax system of modern day states is so complicated that simply figuring out the revenue effect of a tax reform is a formidable task, and the effect on different groups often the subject of intense research. This is the case for relatively minor changes in the system, so a radical reform of say doubling the tax revenue would under most circumstances be extremely costly both economically and politically, and hence not attempted during a single electoral period.
Second, incumbents have an electoral advantage, among other things because the qualifications of incumbents are better known than that of their opponents. Hence if a politician or a party is voted into office in the first place, the probability of remaining in office is higher than coming into office initially. This also gives rise to policy persistence. Moreover, introduction of a new policy will create winners and losers. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that even if the number of winners outnumber the number of losers, uncertainty in whether one ends up as a winner or a looser may make the expected gain negative for a majority of the voters, hence obstructing its implementation.
A final class of explanations is based on special interest groups. Agents can often undertake investments or make other strategic moves to better take advantage of a policy once this policy is implemented. As this raises their utility of the policy, the support for the policy is likely to increase once it is in place, and pressure groups and lobbying may make sure it then remains in place (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Coate and Morris 1999) . Even if no group derives any gains from a certain program, the removal of the program may be costly for some groups, hence hinder its removal (Tullock 1975) . To conclude, there are good reasons to believe that taxes will not change abruptly from one electoral period to the next, but only be changed in small steps in one direction or the other.
For the rational forward looking voter, this has consequences. A voter with a low income today, who in the short run should favour high taxes, may rationally prefer to start lowering the tax level today if she expects her income to increase in the future. Current students who expect to enter a highlypaid profession in the future is one example. The degree of foresight, though, depends on how persistent politics are. If the costs of changing policies are not very high, a single new government can undertake quite radical reforms, so it is not rational to be too concerned about future electoral periods. If on the contrary policies are very persistent, the voter will take the whole path of expected future incomes into consideration when casting her vote.
To explore the foresight of voters, I choose to contrast current income with expected permanent income. If current income is the prime predictor of voting, it indicates that voters are myopic and the politics are non-persistent. If permanent income dominates, it indicates a high ability and willingness to look forward combined with more persistent politics.
Empirical specification of voting behaviour
The arguments outlined above predict that preferences for high taxes are declining in both income today and expected income in the future. If this really matters to voters, it should translate into voting behaviour. To test the hypothesis of forward looking voters, I will estimate the effect of transitory and permanent income on voting behaviour to see which has the largest explanatory power. Although crosscutting cleavages could alter the main conclusions (Roemer 1998 (Roemer , 1999 , it is reasonable to still assume that support for conservative parties would be increasing in today's income and expectations about future income.
For simplicity, I will only consider today's income and the permanent income to matter in the empirical specification. A complete theory would probably indicate that the proper measure is some mixture of the two, such as permanent income with a lower discount factor. The exact specification, however, will depend crucially on exactly how the model is set up. Hence it is more robust and transparent to consider the two extremes. We can then study to what extent permanent income affects voting relative to transitory income. The study is done within a random utility framework (see e.g. Train 2003, Ch. 2) . We may think of this as an extension of a probabilistic voting model. Assume that agent i gets utility
from voting party j at time t. The effect of income on preferences for party j is given by β j , where income is a weighted average of current income y ij and permanent income y * ij . The weight on the former is ζ j and the weight on the latter 1 −ζ j . The constant term α ijt is discussed further below and z it is a vector of other individual characteristics.
3 The residual ε ijt is assumed to have a standard extreme value distribution, so the choice probabilities have a logistic structure. Notice that the utility function (1) is a mere tool for ranking parties, and should not necessarily be given a welfare interpretation.
As argued by Lind (2006) , it is likely that unobserved factors such as social background and experiences affect voting behaviour. These factors are also likely to be correlated with income, so an ordinary logit estimation where these factors are omitted is likely to overestimate the effect of income on voting. To correct for this, we can use panel data techniques. I consider three specifications. First, a simple random effects specification where α ijt consists of a time dummy and an individual effect that is normally distributed and independent of other variables is considered. Second, the same estimator, but with a sample restricted to respondents who voted for different parties in different elections, is considered. This captures what affect party changes. Third a fixed effects estimator where α ijt consists of a period dummy and an individual specific dummy is considered. This specification fully captures unobserved individual specific variables. I also made some attempts using an intermediate specification due to Chamberlain (1980) where α ijt is random, but depends linearly on the across periods mean of income. This gave very similar results so for reasons of space I omit them.
Estimation of the random effects estimator is fairly standard. I use simulated maximum likelihood where a set of draws of α ijt from a multinomial normal distribution with a given variance-covariance matrix is drawn, and the likelihood function is approximated using Monte Carlo integration. Antithetic variates are used to improve the accuracy of the approximation. To estimate the fixed effects model, I follow Chamberlain (1980 Chamberlain ( , 1984 in conditioning on the choices made at some time, and using the order of choice to estimate the parameters, again using maximum likelihood. Voters who vote for the same party in all observations are perfectly predicted by the fixed effects. This implies that only party changers provide information about the parameter values.
Empirical specification of expectations
For obvious reasons we don't have data on the respondents' expectations, so we need to proxy for these. For forward looking behaviour to be meaningful, we must assume that agents receive some signals about their future income. I only study idiosyncratic shocks as aggregate shocks will be picked up by the time dummies included in the model (1). Call this signal s it . An important assumption is that the signal does not directly affect political preferences today, but that they only have an indirect impact through forming expectations about the future.
4 This assumption is the one that will let us identify the effect of permanent versus transitory income. This does not mean that voting is uncorrelated with the signal, only that this correlation is driven by the expectation of changed income in the future.
The signal I use is an indicator of the respondent's subjective opinions on her future economic situation. The wording of the question is Let us think ahead for the next years. Do you think your economic situation is going to be about as today, better than today, or worse than today?
As respondents are asked about their economic situation, and are also asked a separate question on the overall economy, it is plausible that this question measures expectations about idiosyncratic shocks. The indicator s it is coded with the values −1, 0, 1 for worse, as today, and better. Assume that the indicator of expectations follow a Markov process with transition probability matrix Q so
is the probability of going from state i to state j. From repeated observations of the process, it is simple to construct an estimate of Q. As elections are only conducted every 4 years and the survey is undertaken after elections, however, we only observe the process every fourth year, so we can only recover Q 4 . Let U be the matrix of eigenvectors of Q and Λ the matrix with diagonal elements λ i , the eigenvalues of Q. Then we have the eigenvalue decomposition Q = UΛU −1 and hence Q 4 = UΛ 4 U −1 . We can recover the eigenvectors U from Q 4 , and the eigenvalues of Q 4 are λ 
−5 , a necessary condition for Q to be embeddable in a continuous time process is that the eigenvalues are real and positive (Runnenburg 1962, Singer and Spilerman 1976) .
5 The observed eigenvalues of Q 4 are (1; 0.254; 0.166), so we must have λ i > 0 for all i. Then we can easily recover Q from Q 4 . Income is assumed to follow the process
where 1 is the indicator function and ω := (ω −1 , 0, ω 1 ) is the expected effect of the different states of the expectation indicator. That is, income is assumed to follow an AR(1) process where the mean of the innovation depends on the observed signal.
√ λ 4 i , we get that the principal branch of the logarithms is ln (λ) ∈ ln |λ| , ln |λ| + πi, ln |λ| +
to be the only admissible eigenvalue, we need
which gives the requirement on the magnitude of the eigenvalues.
It is tempting to let one time period denote one electoral period, i.e. four years. However, there are two reasons why this is not appropriate. First, in the data set I use, respondents are asked to state their income last year, as this year's income is not yet known at the time of the interview. Second, the signals s it may very well have an impact on income before the next elections. Hence I will take one period to signify one year. Then we have data on y i,t−1 , y i,t+3 , s it , and s i,t+4 . It follows that for k≥1
is a constant and s it the 3 × 1 vector indicating the state of s t at time t. To estimate the parameters, we first estimate Q 4 by finding the distribution of s i,t+4 conditional on s it and deduce Q from the eigenvalue decomposition. Secondly, we regress y i,t+3 on y i,t−1 and s it . The parameter on y i,t−1 is an estimate of φ 4 which may be solved for φ (under the assumption that φ > 0). The parameters on s it can be solved for ω as we have estimates of φ and Q.
In Appendix A it is shown that the agent's expected permanent income at time t, given her information set Ω t , is
where θis the discount rate, u * it a linear combination of the u is 's, I the identity matrix, and π c a constant. Although the agent may have information about the permanent income unknown to the econometrician, so E (u * it |Ω t ) = 0, I will assume that it has expectation zero given the econometrician's information set (i.e. E (u * it |y i,t−1 , s t ) = 0). This will assure that the error term is uncorrelated with the regressors in the second stage of estimation.
Denote by π y := (1 −θ) φ/ (1 −θφ) the effect of current income on permanent income and let π s denote the vector of (1 −θ)
associated with the signals s it .
6 Both π y and π s are known from the two stage 6 To impose that the effect of no signal is zero (i.e. in the constant term), I actually use
estimation above, and y * it = π c + π y y i,t−1 + π s s it . Inserting into the utility function (1), we get
Denote by a j and b j the parameters on y it and π s s it for party j from the logit model on party choice. Then we have
so the impact of income β j and the share of permanent income in the relevant measure of income ζ j may be derived from the estimates of the Markov chain (2), the income process (3), and the logit model (5). Now estimation proceeds in a three step manner. First the Markov chain (2) is estimated using first and second period observations on the signal. Second, the income process (3) is estimated by regressing second period income on first period income and signals. Finally, the logit model (5) is estimated by maximum likelihood, using the estimated parameters from the first two stages and the specifications of the individual specific term outlined above. From this, β j and ζ j are derived using (6). As shown in Appendix B, this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, but an expression for the variance of the parameters is not readily available so it is estimated using bootstrapping. The discount rate is not well identified, so for most of the analyses I assume a 5% annual rate which yields θ= 0.95.
Data
The data are from the Norwegian Election Study from 1977 to 1997, made available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.
78 The survey and then let
7 See Kiberg et al. (2000) for a description of the data. is conducted during the months following every parliamentary election, which take place every 4 years. Hence we have six waves of data. Most respondents are interviewed after two consecutive elections creating a rotating panel data set. The exact questions vary from election to election, but for all elections we have data on party choice, the respondent's household's total income, basic demographic characteristics that are used as control variables, and the answer to the question on whether they believe their economic situation is going to improve, deteriorate, or stay unchanged in the future.
9
For 1993 and 1997, we have the household's income in 1000 NOK. Before 1993, we only have data on which income bracket the respondent's household is in. To make the data comparable across years, I assume the income distribution is log normal so I can use Monte Carlo integration to estimate the effect of income.
10 To avoid concerns about inflation and wage growth, income is measured relative to period-specific average income. This is also the relevant measure of income in most models of determination of tax preferences as tax revenue depends on average income.
Norway has a proportional electoral system and a relatively large number of parties represented in parliament. I group the parties into five groups: The Socialist parties consist of the Social Leftist party as well as the Norwegian Communist Party and the Workers' Communist Party. The Labour party is treated alone. As this is the largest party, I use it as the reference group. Then follows the Centre parties which consist of the Centre Party, the Liberal party (Venstre), the Liberal Popular Party, and the Christian Popular Party. The Conservative party (Høyre) and the Progress party are grouped alone. A small number of individuals casting their votes for different parties are trimmed from the sample. There is a quite general consensus by different researchers using different techniques that the order of presentation given here is a reasonable ordering from left to right of these parties (Rasch 2003) .
Estimation results
As a reference point, Table 1 reports the estimates from two specifications of the baseline logit model (1). In both specifications, the weight on transitory income ζis constrained to unity. For both specifications, I estimated the random effects model with the whole sample and the sub-sample that changes party, as well as the fixed effects specification, which only uses the latter sample. Income is measured relative to the period averages. In the first specification, reported in columns 1 to 3, regressors include income and the control variables, whereas the second specification, reported in columns 4 to 6, also includes dummies for expectations of one's economic situation.
As we would expect, income has a positive effect on voting for the Conservative party. However, allowing for correlation between the individual effect and income by introducing fixed effects, this effect is sharply reduced. This was studied in more detail in Lind (2006) . We also notice that inclusion of the proxies in columns 4 to 6 have a small impact on the effect of income, although the estimated parameters are slightly smaller than those in the first part of the table. Second, the expectations about the economic situation seem to have a considerable impact on voting behaviour. The lower row of the table gives test statistics of likelihood ratio tests of the new proxies being insignificant. It is seen that this hypothesis is rejected, often at extreme significance. The signs of the parameters are also sensible: Prospects of a better economic situation induces right-wing voting whereas prospects of a worsened economic situation and fear of unemployment induces left-wing voting. This is also the case for the fixed effects estimator, so it seems that it is the expectations that influences voting, and not only left-wing voters being more pessimistic than right-wing voters. Finally, it is seen that expectations have a considerable effect on choice probabilities. Going from expecting no change in the economic situation to expecting an improvement has the same effect on preferences for voting Conservative as between one and two additional average incomes, i.e. between 1.25 and 2.5 standard deviations.
Let us now turn to the estimation procedure for the effects of permanent income outlined above. Table 2 reports results from the estimation of the income process. Panel A reports the directly estimated Q 4 and the estimate of Q from the eigenvalue decomposition. We notice that the transition matrix has most of its weight along the diagonal, indicating a quite persistent process.
Panel B reports the estimation of the income process (3) and the derived estimates of π y and π s from (4). The ordinary estimation is labelled "unconstrained estimation". The constrained estimation is discussed below. As expected, those who expect a better economic situation in the future on average have higher income growth than others, and vice versa for those who expect a worsened situation. However, the effect is not very large; 14.7% and 2.8% of the average income.
Looking at the derived π y and π s , the effects on permanent income of expecting better and worse economic conditions are 9.3% and 1.8%. Due to the non-linearity of the model, the standard errors of π y and π s are derived using bootstrapping. The same bootstraps indicate that the bias of the estimators are negligible. Table 3 reports results from the logit model (1). The parameters a and b, reported in the first half of the table, are the estimated parameters on y i,t−1 and π s s it , whereas β, the impact of the relevant measure of income on voting behaviour, and ζ, the share of current income in this measure, both reported in the second half of the table, are derived using (6). The most striking feature is the estimates of ζ. They are almost all between -0.2 and -0.4, and a number of them are significantly different from zero. This implies that current income has a negative impact on agents' relevant measure of income. Although it may seem plausible that permanent income is more important than current income, this result seems too strong.
An obvious problem with the above procedure is that the income process (3) assumes that all agents are equal in the sense that, shocks absent, they will converge to the same income in the long run. This is unlikely to be the case, so estimation should include an individual specific term. Neglecting this results in an upward bias of the autoregressive coefficient of income φ, and then also an upward bias in π y as an income shock is seen as having a larger effect on permanent income than it really has. This will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of ζ.
This could be solved by introducing an individual specific constant term in (3). The individual effects that should be in the model of the income process are certainly correlated with income, so we should use fixed effects estimation. As the electoral data only have two observations per individual, this is not possible with the present data alone. However, we can obtain an estimate by imputing information from other data sources. Using a 10% sample of the Norwegian register data (a total of 1 316 880 observations) described in e.g. Røed and Raaum (2003) and estimating a simple AR(1) process of the form
we get an estimate φ OLS = 0.864(.00058) without fixed effects and φ AB = 0.276(.0025) using Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator for fixed effects data with lagged dependent variables. The estimate of φ 4 from the election survey is 0.543, yielding an annual coefficient of φ OLS = 0.858. As φ OLS and φ OLS are very close, it seems reasonable to impute the coefficient of φ from the estimates from the register data. To adjust for the small difference, I use an imputed value in (4) calculated from Values are the parameters from the regression of income on one period lagged variables. Constrained estimation is performed with imposing the value of φ. Income is measured relative to period average. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors of the derived πs are estimated using bootstrapping with 100 replications. 0.037 0.659 Numbers are coefficients on income and proxy for future income and derived βs and ζs. Standard errors in parenthesis. LR (4) is an LR-test against the unrestricted models in Table 1 .
The estimated φ OLS and φ AB have so small standard errors so they are treated as fixed when calculating standard errors. The variance in φ OLS is taken into account in the bootstrapping.
If income is assumed to follow (7), the individual specific fixed effect µ i would also enter in the utility function (5). As we cannot observe µ i , the best way to control for this is to rely on fixed effects in the estimation of the logit model as well. Estimation with random effects is likely to be inconsistent, so estimation using the imputed value of φ I is only reported using fixed effects.
Imposing this parameter in the model for the income process (3) yields the results reported in the last two columns of panel B of Table 2 . Most importantly, we see that the estimate of π y is much smaller. This is because we had an estimate of φ that was too high, so it seemed as if income was more persistent than it really is, so the effect of an increase in income was taken to be higher than it really is. The new π y reflects that income in one period has a smaller impact on income in the future. Also π s is changed, but to a smaller extent.
Panel A of Table 4 reports results from the logit analysis imposing φ = φ I . These estimates seem more sensible. Most of the shares on transitory income ζare numerically close to zero, and no parameters are significantly different from zero. As we would expect, the estimates of the income effects βare very different from the ordinary logit estimates presented in Table 1 . The income effect on the Conservative party is positive and numerically large. Compared to Table 1 , the estimated parameter values are huge. The effect on the Socialist parties is also interesting. In Table 1 the income effect was insignificant, but slightly positive. Now it is negative and numerically quite large.
As ζ, the share put on transitory income, was estimated close to zero, it is interesting to test whether ζis significantly different from zero and study the effect on the estimated income parameters of imposing this restriction. Panel B of Table 4 reports results from an estimation where we impose ζ= 0 and use the imputed φ I . We first notice that, using a likelihood ratio test, we cannot reject this restriction. Consequently, it seems that permanent income is the most relevant measure of income to determine party preferences. We also see that imposing ζ= 0 only has small effects on the estimated income effects. The impact on the Conservative party is large, positive, and significantly different from zero. The effect on the Socialist parties is negative, rather large, but not significantly different from zero. The effects on the Centre and Progress parties are small and not significantly different from zero. 7 Are voters really perfectly non-myopic?
The results above indicate that transitory income has no effect on voting behaviour once permanent income is accounted for. There are two reasons why this may be surprising. First we usually believe people behave somewhat myopically, so they should put more emphasis on today than the future. Second, unless political persistence is very high, even perfectly forward looking rational agents would put more emphasis on the next electoral period than the future ones as policies may be changed in the future. One problem could be that current and permanent income are closely correlated, so multicollinearity leads to a very low estimate of the weight ζ. However, in the model with a restricted φ, the correlation between the two is only 0.39. Although the two are clearly correlated, they are not so highly correlated that this should be a severe problem.
Another objection to the estimates above is that the discount factor was imposed at θ= .95, which may be too high if policies are not very persistent. The value was chosen to get a strong contrast to the myopic voter who only looks at her transitory income. Ideally, the relevant discount factor should be estimated. However, it is weakly identified, so this does not give meaningful estimates. As a robustness check, Figure 1 report estimates with different discount factors between 0.85 and 0.99. The estimates of ζseem to be somewhat dependent on the chosen discount factor, with low values of θleading to more extreme estimates of ζand higher values to values closer to 0. The estimates of βdepend less on the chosen discount factor except for the very high values of θwhere the estimated income effects βtend to get more extreme values.
A third possible explanation may be what we can label the "dream effect". At least for some voters, the statement that they expect their economic situation to improve in the future may simply mean that they hope it will improve in the future. They may anticipate this by voting Conservative today. However, as the economic future was based more on a hope than a certainty, the effect on income is on average weak. Together, these may tend to overstate the effect of permanent income on voting and hence explain both high βs and low ζs for the Conservative party. We could also have a similar "nightmare effect" for the Socialist party where fear of lower income and Socialist voting are correlated. If this is the case, the effect of an expected improvement should have a higher effect than today's income and expected worsening on Conservative voting whereas an expected worsening should have an exceptionally high effect on Socialist voting. Table 5 reports results from an estimation where I have disaggregated the effects of today's income, expected worsened economic situation, and expected better economic situation. We see that there is little evidence of any "dream effect" for the Conservative party as we don't get higher coefficients on "Better economy"than on the other predictors of future income. For the Socialist party, however, there seem to be some evidence of a "nightmare effect" as the impact of "Worse economy"is larger than the other predictors.
A related explanation could be that agents exhibit loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991), so their utility functions have a kink at the current consumption level and the utility loss from a marginal decrease in consumption is judged larger than the gain from an increase. This will increase the sensitivity of the tax preferences to signals about future income whereas the effect of current income is unchanged. If we believe the classic explanation of such a results, that voters are extremely forward looking, to be false, this gives an indication of loss aversion theory being true. Values are the coefficients on permanent income. Standard errors in parenthesis. ζ= 0 is assumed and the imputed φ I is used.
Conclusion
If policies are persistent, for instance because policy changes are costly, then preferences for redistribution will partially depend on expectations about future income. To test this prediction, I study the impact of transitory versus permanent income on party preferences using Norwegian electoral data within a random utility model with individual specific effects. To identify the effect of permanent income, I use the answer to questions about agents' expected future economic situation. This does not affect income today and should not have a direct influence on party preferences. However, it does affect future income. This effect is estimated and used to construct a proxy for permanent income. There are two main conclusions. First, a high income has the expected effect of increasing the probability of voting Conservative and reducing the probability of voting Socialist. Second, the effect of transitory income is virtually absent once permanent income is taken into account. Hence it seems voters are extremely forward looking. However, there are some caveats to this conclusion. Alternative explanations based on misunderstanding of the expectations-question and preferences admitting loss aversion could to some extent explain this finding. However, there is still considerable evidence for strong forward looking voting. As policies do change over time, and hence are not extremely persistent, there is still a question why voters put so much emphasis on expectations about the future and so little emphasis on their current situation.
A Derivation of expression (4)
The permanent income is given by 
B Asymptotic properties of the estimator
To show consistency of this three step estimator, denote by M (Q) the likelihood of the Markov chain (2), S (Π; Q) minus the total sum of squares for the income process (3) and L (Θ; Π, Q) the log likelihood of model (5), where Θ are the parameters entering this model. We can now construct an M-estimator for Q,Πa n dΘa sthe values that minimize M (Q) + S (Π; Q) + L (Θ; Π, Q), and under the present conditions, consistency is assured (see e.g. van der Vaart (1998, ch. 5)). As Θ does not enter into S and M and Π doesn't enter into M, we can first maximize M separately to obtain consistent estimates of Q. Call these Q. As these are consistent, we can then plug them into S to obtain consistent estimates of Π by partial maximization of S with regard to Π given Q. Call these estimates Π. Then we repeat the same procedure by plugging Q and Π into L and maximize partially with regard to Θ. As Π and Q are estimates, we cannot use standard results on the distribution of the maximum likelihood estimators to study the distribution of Θ. However, Π and Q are √ n-consistent, and as Θ may be treated as an estimate from an M-estimator with nuisance parameters, it follows from Theorem 5.31 in van der Vaart (1998) that the distribution of Θ is normal, but usually with a different covariance matrix than the inverse Hessian of the log likelihood. Although we can construct analytical approximations, I rely on bootstrapping to estimate this matrix.
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